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VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL
RESOURCES: HAS THE HIGH COURT




Due to staggering healthcare costs and the industry's susceptibility to
fraud, the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), under the Clinton
Administration, made prosecuting healthcare fraud a top priority, second
only to violent crime.' The "primary litigative tool" in prosecuting
healthcare fraud is the federal False Claims Act ("FCA").2 According to
DOJ statistics and reports, the FCA has earned the United States
Treasury close to $4 billion, with individual citizens receiving about $629
million since 1986.3
In most FCA and qui tam4 cases, including healthcare, liability requires
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1. See Shari G. Kleiner, et al., Health Care Fraud, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 773,
774-75 (1999).
2. See Senate Judiciary Committee, False Claims Amendments of 1986, S.
Rep. No.99-345, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266 [hereinafter
"Senate Report"].
3. See Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, Fried Frank Qui Tam
Page-FCA Statistics, at http://www.ffhsj.com/quitam/fcastats.htm (last modified
Jan. 13, 1999). Under the FCA, both the government and the individual who
instigated the complaint receive a portion of the damages awarded.
4. The term "qui tam" is derived from the Latin phrase "qui tam pro domino
rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur," meaning "he who brings an action for
the King as well as for himself." See Note, The History and Development of Qui
Tam, 1972 WASH. U. L. Q. 81, 83 (citing 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
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proof of at least three elements: (1) the person must present, or cause
another person to present, a "claim" for payment to the United States; (2)
the claim must be "false or fraudulent"; and (3) either submission of
documents and information or identification of such documents and
information must be made available to the government
The basic scenario of fraudulent behavior in the healthcare setting
involves a provider who claims a reimbursement from a federal healthcare
program, such as Medicare, for a more expensive treatment than was
actually provided to the beneficiary.6 Common types of qui tam relators'
are current and former employees.! The suit is filed on behalf of the
Government, yet the relator still retains a monetary interest in the share
of damages that the Government recovers as a result of the litigation,
regardless of whether the Government actually intervenes.9 If the
Government intervenes, the odds of a significant settlement or judgment
in a qui tam case increases dramatically.' °
Recently, there have been a number of high-profile FCA cases brought
by qui tam relators against state institutions, which have resulted in
million dollar settlements in favor of the federal Government." However,
the United States Supreme Court of the United States recently held that a
private person cannot bring a qui tam claim under the FCA against a state
or state entity in the name of the United States Government. 12 Vermont
LAWS OF ENGLAND 160 (1768)). Essentially, the qui tam provision allows a
private plaintiff to step into the shoes of the government and file a civil action on
its behalf against another party for violation of the FCA.
5. See John T. Boese, Key Corporate Issues in Healthcare Fraud: False
Claims Act Liability, Due Diligence, and Corporate Compliance Programs, 1997
A.B.A. SEC. Bus. L. REP. 43,45.
6. See id.
7. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (1994) ("A person may bring a civil action for a
violation of § 3729 for the person and for the United States Government. The
action shall be in the name of the Government.").
8. See Boese, supra note 5, at 49.
9. See A.B.A., Sec. Pub. Contract L., Procurement Fraud Committee, Qui
Tam Litigation Under the False Claims Act, at 1 (2 ed. 1999).
10. See Boese, supra note 5, at 51.
11. For example, the University of Pittsburgh Medical School settled with the
federal Government in February 1998 for $17 million in a case involving billing
errors to Medicare. See Jack J. Chielli, Teaching Hospital Audits Hit Region, at
http://physiciansnews.com/cover/598wp.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2002).
12. See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources
Agency of Natural Resources v. U.S. involved a qui tam action filed by
Jonathon Stevens, a former employee, who claimed that the state agency
had submitted false claims in connection with federal grant programs."
As a result of the Court's ruling in Vermont Agency, the opportunity for
whistleblowers to sue state sovereigns on behalf of the federal
Government has effectively been eliminated.
Additionally, there are two competing effects of the ruling. First, the
ruling will act as a shield against those who are motivated purely by
financial interests in claiming that federal programs have been defrauded.
Second, it opens the door to prolonged fraudulent behavior, which may
go virtually unchecked without the ability to initiate qui tam litigation.
The question left untouched by the Court is how these two adverse effects
will counterbalance one another.
This Note focuses on the status of qui tam litigation under the FCA and
its effects on the healthcare community. Part I examines the FCA and the
qui tam provision's "facelift" in response to widespread fraud against the
federal Government. Next, it examines the nature of legal protection
given to the States and state entities, beginning with the legal analysis
engendered in the split between the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal.
The Note then analyzes the Supreme Court's holding in Vermont Agency
and its possible ramifications in combating healthcare fraud. This Note
then parses the facts of Vermont Agency in which the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine sovereign immunity under the FCA.
Part II analyzes how the Court's ruling will affect the Government's
nationwide review of compliance with billing procedures at teaching
hospitals, formally known as Physicians at Teaching Hospitals ("PATH")
audits. The first section briefly describes the PATH initiative. The
second section discusses the lawsuit brought in the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals by the Association of American Medical Colleges, responding to
the Government's aggressive enforcement of the PATH initiative.
Part III explores the current backlash by healthcare providers against
the government's efforts to combat fraud and abuse. The issue raised by
provider backlash is whether such fraud and abuse enforcement has gone
too far. Finally, the Note suggests that the Court's ruling is not
destructive to the fight against healthcare fraud; rather, it will be
beneficial to the Government and healthcare providers alike. The Court
U.S. 765 (2000).
13. See id. at 770.
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correctly erected a necessary boundary on the use of the qui tam provision
of the FCA. Private litigants will have to think twice before using the qui
tam provision as an instrument to combat fraud. Moreover, the Court's
ruling encourages both state-funded and private hospitals to implement
compliance programs from the very beginning, rather than waiting until
they are slapped with a high-priced lawsuit.
I. CAN CITIZENS ACTING ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT SUE THE STATES UNDER THE
FALSE CLAIMS ACT?
A. The Qui Tam Provision of the False Claims Act
Originally enacted in 1863,'" the FCA's statutory intent was to
discourage corruption and fraudulent claims among defense contractors
during the Civil War.15 The FCA authorized private informers, known as
"qui tam relators," to file civil actions against persons who knowingly
perpetrated fraudulent claims upon the federal Government. As an
incentive to prosecuting these actions without Government interference,
the FCA provided the relator with fifty percent of all damages
recovered,16 including a $2,000 penalty for each false claim by a
Government contractor. 7
The period after the Civil War marked a time when the judiciary
increasingly imposed its discretion on how much of the fifty percent of
damages the relator would be awarded, thereby sparking a gradual
decrease in the FCA's use.' 8 Subsequently, Congress significantly revised
the FCA in 1943.19 The FCA amendments constricted both the capability
of a qui tam relator to bring a false claims suit, as well as the ability to
14. The statute was originally codified as the Act of March 2, 1863, at ch. 67,
12 Stat. 696-98 (1863). It was later reenacted by Rev. Stat. §§ 3490-94 and 5438
(1878).
15. See United States v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853, 857 (7th Cir.
1999).
16. See John C. Ruhnka, et al., Qui Tam Claims: Threat to Voluntary
Compliance Programs in Health Care Organizations, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y &
L. 283, 285 (2000).
17. See Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696, 698 (1863).
18. See Ruhnka, et al., supra note 16, at 286.
19. See id.
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recover any potential "bounty."2 As a result of these changes, private
person use of the FCA to fight fraudulent behavior almost became
obsolete.
1. The 1986 Legislative Amendments
After a series of defense contractor fraud scandals in the 1980's,
Senators Charles Grassley, Dennis DeConini and Carl Levin led a
movement in the Senate to reform the FCA.1 In 1986, Congressional
hearings demonstrated that the incentives for qui tam relators to bring
suit had diminished and extensive amendments were necessary.22 The
goal of the 1986 amendments was to promote the "relator's ability to
assist the [G]overnment in investigating, detecting, and litigating FCA
suits. ' 2-" Essentially, the newly renovated qui tam provisions created
greater incentives for private citizens to "blow the whistle" on fraud. 2
To encourage private citizens to volunteer information regarding
behavior which defrauds the federal Government, the amended
legislation raises the stakes considerably by increasing recoverable
damages.2 For example, if the qui tam relator prosecutes the case absent
Government intervention, the amount receivable rises from twenty-five
percent to a maximum of thirty percent of the recovered damages. 26 In
cases of Government intervention, "the bounty was increased from a
minimum of ten percent to the range of fifteen to twenty-five percent.,
27
20. See A.B.A., supra note 9; see generally United States ex rel. Wisconsin v.
Dean, 729 F.2d 1100, 1106-07 (7th Cir. 1984) (the State of Wisconsin could not
bring a qui tam action because the information on which the action was based was
in the Government's possession at the time the lawsuit was filed).
21. See A.B.A., supra note 9, at 1-2.
22. See S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 33 ("The Committee favorably reported S. 1562
[the False Claims Reform Act], as amended, by unanimous consent on December
12, 1985.").
23. A.B.A., supra note 9, at 6. See also Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153
(1986) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733).
24. See Martie Ross & Jenny Brannon, False Claims Act and Qui Tam
Litigation: The Government Giveth and the Government Taketh Away (And Then
Some), 68 J. KAN. BAR Assoc. 20, 21 (1999).
25. See Jonathon M. Kaye & John Patrick Sullivan, False Claims, 30 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 643,650 (1993).
26. See A.B.A., supra note 9, at 8; 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (1994).
27. Id. See also 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (1994).
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Moreover, the 1986 amendments eased the burden of proof for both
the Government and relators, providing that allegations of false claims
need only be proven by a "preponderance of the evidence," rather than
the "clear and convincing evidence" standard previously required under
the FCA. 8
Similarly, the 1986 amendments also lightened the procedural
requirements of the FCA. Most notably, the amendments extended the
applicable statute of limitations. Originally, the FCA statute of
limitations was six years from the time when the false claim was
submitted. 9 This period was modified to allow an action to be brought
within three years, "after the date when facts material to the right of
action are known or reasonably should have been known by the official of
the United States charged with responsibility to act in the
circumstances. "' The legislative history reveals Congress' concern that
"because fraud is, by nature, deceptive, such tolling of the statute of
limitations is necessary to ensure the Government's rights are not lost
through a wrongdoer's successful deception.""1
Since the 1986 amendments to the FCA, qui tam litigation has
exploded. 2 In particular, the Government's recent commitment to attack
healthcare fraud has fostered a significant increase in FCA actions filed
against healthcare providers.3 However, recent court rulings render the
28. See A.B.A., supra note 9, at 10. See also Ross & Brannon, supra note 24.
29. See S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 15.
30. 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(2) (1994).
31. S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 15.
32. Since the amendments were passed, over 2,000 qui tam cases have been
filed. See JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QuI TAM AcTIONS, at 1-4
(Aspen Law & Business, Supp. 1999). See also Mary Thompson & Michael D.
Siemer, Qui Tam Litigation: Pursuing Claims for Private Gain Under the Federal
False Claims Act, 37 Hous. LAW. 18, 20 (2000) (reporting that the number of qui
tam cases has risen from 33 cases in 1987 to 417 cases in 1998); Ross & Brannon,
supra note 24, at 23 ("More than $2 billion has been recovered in those actions in
which the [G]overnment has assumed prosecution of the suit."); Taxpayers
Against Fraud, Qui Tam Statistics, at http://www.taf.org/statistics (DOJ has
intervened in or pursued 267 of the 2,000 cases and declined to intervene in 1,009)
(last visited Jan. 23, 2002)..
33. See Ross & Brannon, supra note 24, at 21 ("[C]ases involving allegations
of healthcare fraud accounted for more than 60 percent of the new qui tam cases
filed in 1998."); see also Taxpayers Against Fraud, at http://www.taf.org/taf/ (last
visited Oct. 26, 2000).
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future of qui tam healthcare litigation uncertain:"
B. States Are Immune from Qui Tam Claims, But On What Legal
Basis?
1. A Split Among the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal
State defendants in past qui tam cases have argued that, because states
are not "persons" within the meaning of the FCA, sovereign immunity
pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment bars qui tam suits against state
entities. 5 This argument typically has been rejected.36 However, in 1999,
the Fifth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit both issued similar decisions within
days of each other. Both courts held that whistleblowers may not bring
suits under the FCA against States or state entities,3 7 although on
somewhat different grounds.
The Fifth Circuit heard the case of Carol Foulds, a medical resident at
Texas Tech Health Sciences Center ("Texas defendants"), who
discovered that her employer was submitting allegedly false claims to
Medicare and Medicaid. 3  Foulds filed a qui tam action in the district
court in August 1995. When the United States Government failed to
intervene in a timely manner,39 the Texas defendants moved to dismiss the
action, arguing primarily that the FCA suit failed to meet the
requirements set forth by the Supreme Court in Seminole Tribe of Florida
v. Florida.' The district court denied the Texas defendants' motion to
34. See Thompson & Siemer, supra note 32, at 21.
35. See John T. Boese & Beth C. McClain, High Court Will Hear Case on
FCA Suits Against State Entities, 2 No. 6 HEALTH CARE FRAUD & ABUSE NEWSL.
(Leader Publications, division of American Lawyer Media), July 1999, at 8.
36. See U.S. ex rel. Zissler v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 154 F.3d 870, 875
(8th Cir. 1998); U.S. ex rel. Milam v. Univ. of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr.,
961 F.2d 46, 50 (4th Cir. 1992).
37. See U.S. ex rel. Foulds v. Texas Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 294 (5th Cir.
1999); U.S. ex rel. Long v. SCS Bus. & Tech. Inst., 173 F.3d 870, 884 n.16 (D.C.
Cir. 1999).
38. See Foulds, 171 F.3d at 282. Foulds alleged that, during a ten-year period,
approximately 500,000 false claims were submitted to the Government. Id.
39. See id. at 283.
40. 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Congress may not abrogate the immunity of the States
unless its intent to do so is clearly stated and is consistent with § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment); see Foulds, 171 F.3d at 283-84.
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dismiss and noted that Seminole Tribe applies only to situations where
Congress attempts to subject the states to private suits, not to suits by the
United States.4'
Having filed an interlocutory appeal, a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed and remanded the district court's decision.42 Writing
for the panel, Judge Jolly elected to "begin and end with [a] jurisdictional
[analysis] vis d vis the Eleventh Amendment., 43 The court focused on the
plain language of the Eleventh Amendment to decide whether the case
was "commenced or prosecuted"" by a citizen or by the United States
itself.45 Judge Jolly declared, "[I]t is as plain as the sun that this suit was
not commenced by the United States and that the United States has not
intervened to prosecute this case.',4' The court found that the federal
Government is a "passive party, 47 when they decline to assume control of
the litigation. Further, the court noted that qui tam relators were
"deputized" under the FCA as "responsible federal officers" with the
right to represent the sovereign.4
In addition to finding that a private citizen had commenced and
prosecuted the suit "within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment,"
the court applied the two-prong test articulated in Seminole Tribe to
"determine whether Congress ha[d] abrogated the States' sovereign
immunity., 4 Because there was no clear intent by Congress to abrogate
41. See U.S. ex rel. Foulds v. Texas Tech Univ., 980 F. Supp. 864, 870 (N.D.
Tex. 1997)(The district court relied on Milam, 961 F.2d at 46, noting that qui tam
actions in which the DOJ does not intervene are still essentially lawsuits by the
United States, and therefore the Eleventh Amendment is not an obstacle to
bringing suit under the FCA.
42. See Foulds, 171 F.3d at 295.
43. See id. at 285-86 ("It is the Eleventh Amendment's restraint on 'Judicial
power' that requires us to confront the Eleventh Amendment before employing
our power to interpret statutory text.").
44. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI.
45. See Foulds, 171 F.3d at 289. See also Margaret A. Cassisa, Silencing the
Whistleblower's Whistle: The Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity in Qui
Tam Actions Filed Against the States Without Government Intervention, 45 LoY. L.
REV. 565, 578 (1999).
46. See Foulds, 171 F.3d at 289.
47. Id. at 291.
48. Id. at 293.
49. Id. at 294.
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immunity, the court ended its judicial inquiry," finding it unnecessary to
analyze the second prong of the test. Incidentally, the second prong of
the test determines "whether Congress has acted 'pursuant to a valid
exercise of power.' 5.
Three days after the Foulds decision, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled on the very same fundamental
issue, however taking a different approach. 2 Ronald Long had been
employed as the Coordinator of Investigations and Audit for a branch of
the New York State Department of Education. 3 After an investigation of
SCS Business and Technical Institute ("SCS") in 1989, Long discovered
that New York state officials allegedly conspired to conceal fraudulent
claims made to the federal Government in return for federal funding of
tuition assistance programs at SCS.' Additionally, Long claimed that
from the time he reported the incident to the authorities, his supervisor
and other state officials limited his ability to investigate the matter
further.5 Eventually, Long was taken off the case. Subsequently, he was
fired in 1992, shortly after SCS settled with the Government:
Thereafter, Long filed a qui tam claim against SCS and its officials. 7
The United States Government intervened in the case against SCS, but
not against the state officials. 8 As a result, the state officials moved to
dismiss the complaint on grounds that states are not "persons" as defined
by § 3729 of the FCA and, in the alternative, that the Eleventh
Amendment bars recovery: 9 Following the denial of the State's motion,'
the defendants filed an appeal challenging the district court's finding that
the suit could proceed.61
Contrary to the Fifth Circuit's assertion, the D.C. Circuit did not base
50. See id.
51. Id.
52. See Boese & McClain, supra note 35, at 9.
53. See Long, 173 F.3d at 872.
54. Id. See also Boese & McClain, supra note 35, at 9.
55. See Long, 173 F.3d at 872.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 873.
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. See U.S. v. ex rel. Long v. SCS Bus. & Tech. Inst., 999 F. Supp. 78, 91-93
(D.D.C. 1998).
61. See Long, 173 F.3d at 873.
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its ruling on the Eleventh Amendment, but on two previous Supreme
Court decisions: Will v. Michigan Department of State Police62 and Wilson
v. Omaha Indian Tribe.6 Both decisions held that, when Congress fails to
define the term "person," the Supreme Court presumes that "the term
'person' does not include the sovereign, [and] statutes employing the
[term] are ordinarily construed to exclude it.''  Reviewing legislative
history, the circuit court found no legislative intent in the 1986 legislative
amendments to include states within the confines of the term "person." 6-
The court concluded that Congress must make its intent "unmistakably
clear" if states are subject to liability under the FCA.
Both decisions are of monumental importance for state entities that
receive federal funding. 7 While the Foulds holding is limited to those
61cases in which the federal Government does not intervene, the holding in
Long has a much broader reach.6 9 Nonetheless, both cases raise questions
regarding the federal Government's enforcement efforts under the FCA
aimed "at state-run teaching hospitals under the Physicians at Teaching
Hospitals ("PATH") initiative." 70  The U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Vermont Agency in order to resolve the propriety of FCA
62. 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
63. 442 U.S. 653 (1979).
64. Long, 173 F.3d at 874 (quoting Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 64 (1989) (and Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 667 (1979).
65. Long, 173 F.3d at 876. But see S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 9 ("The False Claims
Act is intended to reach all fraudulent attempts to cause the Government to pay
sums of money or to deliver property or services.")(emphasis added).
66. See Long, 173 F.3d at 887.
67. Boese & McClain, supra note 35, at 10.
68. See Foulds, 171 F.3d at 283.
69. See Long, 173 F.3d at 884 (providing that not only is the qui tam relator a
"real party in interest," but the United States is also a "real party in interest").
70. Boese & McClain, supra note 35, at 10. See also Shelley R. Slade &
Thomas A. Colthurst, Health Care Fraud and the False Claims Act: The Supreme
Court Supports a Federal Weapon, 10 Bus. L. TODAY 1, 24-27 (2000). The
Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") Office of Inspector General
("OIG") initiated the PATH project in order to determine whether, and to what
extent, compliance with Intermediary Letter 372, the Medicare rule affecting
physician services provided by residents, has been affected. The PATH initiative
and its relation to the FCA is further discussed in Part III of this Note. See Ass'n
Am. Med. C., Background Paper: PATH Initiative, at
http://www.aamc.org/hlthcare/path/bckgrnd.htm (last modified Dec. 7, 1999).
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suits against state sovereigns."
2. High Court Settles the Split
In Vermont Agency, the U.S. Supreme Court, for the first time,
addressed whether the FCA's whistleblower provision applies to
sovereign states or their agencies.7 The controversy involved a qui tam
action filed by Jonathon Stevens against his former employer, the
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources ("VANR"), a state agency. The
complaint alleged that the agency had defrauded the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") by submitting false claims "in connection
with various federal grant programs administered by the EPA., 71 In
particular, the relator, Mr. Stevens, claimed that the state agency had
overstated the time its employees had spent working on federally funded
projects, "thereby inducing the Government to disburse more grant
money than [the agency] was entitled to receive."'7 After the United
States Government declined to intervene, VANR moved to dismiss,
arguing that neither a State nor a state agency is "a 'person' subject to
liability under the FCA,"7 and further, that the action is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment.
76
When the United States District Court for the District of Vermont
denied the motion, VANR filed an interlocutory appeal." Subsequently,
the United States Government intervened in the suit.7 8 A divided panel of
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
decision." Thereafter, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
the split among the circuits.8
71. Boese & McClain, supra note 35, at 8.
72. See Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 768.




77. A denied "motion to dismiss based upon a claim of Eleventh Amendment
immunity is immediately appealable." Id. at 770 (citing Puerto Rico Aqueduct &
Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144-45 (1993)).
78. Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 770.
79. United States ex rel. Stevens v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources,
162 F.3d 195, 198 (2 Cir. 1998).
80. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 527 U.S.
1034 (1999).
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First, the Court approached the jurisdictional issue of whether private
individuals have standing to maintain a FCA suit under Article III of the
Constitution." The Court, per Justice Scalia, concluded that a qui tam
relator does have standing to sue under Article III of the Constitution.'
Of the three requirements constituting the "irreducible constitutional
minimum" of standing, Justice Scalia focused on the "injury in fact"
requirement." Considering the injury in fact requirement of Article III
standing, Justice Scalia looked to the text of the statute and rejected the
notion that qui tam relators are "statutorily designated agent[s]"' of the
Government, who receive their award "out of the United States' recovery
for filing and/or prosecuting a successful action on behalf of the
Government." 8' The Court found that the agency analysis was precluded
by the statute because it provides the relator with "an interest in the
lawsuit."'
In rejecting the agency argument, the Court emphasized that the
"interest must consist of obtaining compensation for, or preventing, the
violation of a legally protected right."' The Court then concluded that
there was a "fairly trace[able]" connection between the alleged injury in
fact and the alleged conduct of the state agency.8 Strengthening its
conclusion, the Court noted the expansive and developed history of qui
tam actions both in England and the United States.' The Court went on
to declare that this long tradition, coupled with the application of the
doctrine of assignment,9° "leaves no room for doubt that a qui tam relator
under the FCA has Article III standing." 91
81. See Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 771. The issue of whether relators had
Article III standing to bring qui tam actions was addressed by the Court sua
sponte; see also Slade & Colthurst, supra note 70, at 28.
82. See Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 774.
83. Id. at 771.
84. Id. at 772.
85. Id.
86. Id. (emphasis omitted).
87. Id. at 772-73.
88. Id. at 771.
89. See id. at 774-75.
90. See id. at 773-74 ("[A]dequate basis for the relator's suit for his bounty is
to be found in the doctrine that the assignee of a claim has standing to assert the
injury in fact suffered by the assignor.").
91. See id. at 778.
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Concluding that a relator has standing, the Court moved on to examine
the central issue of whether a qui tam plaintiff could sue the States and
state entities under the FCA. 2  Before approaching the question of
whether the Eleventh Amendment bars a qui tam action against the
states, the Court began and ended with the statutory inquiry of § 3729(a)
of the FCA.93  The Court utilized its "longstanding interpretive
presumption that 'person' does not include the sovereign,"9 a rule that
will only be disregarded by the Court upon some showing of
Congressional "intent to the contrary".95
The Court logically turned to the legislative history of the Act.96 Taking
a formalist approach, Justice Scalia found that the equivalent of § 3729(a)
in the original language of the FCA "bore no indication that States were
subject to its penalities. '9 7 Noting that the FCA had undergone changes in
1982 and 1986, the Court found nothing in either amendment which
reflected a Congressional intent to expand the term "person" to
encompass the states.98 Additionally, the Court remarked that the current
version of the FCA provides for punitive damages, which is in direct
contradiction to the presumption that punitive damages ought not be
imposed on governmental bodies.99 The Court reversed the Second
Circuit holding that while a private individual has standing to bring a qui
tam claim under the FCA, neither a state nor a state agency is subject to
liability.)
°°
Though Justice Scalia "seemingly took pains to limit the majority's
ruling,"' ' the decision leaves the door open to other challenges against the
92. See id.; see also Slade & Colthurst, supra note 70, at 28.
93. See Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 779 ("When these two questions are at
issue, not only is the statutory question 'logically antecedent to the existence of'
the Eleventh Amendment question, but also there is no realistic possibility that
addressing the statutory question will expand the Court's power beyond the limits
that the jurisdictional restriction has imposed.").
94. Id. at 780.
95. Id. at 781.
96. See id. at 781-82; see also A.B.A., supra note 9, at 1.
97. Id. at 782.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 784-85.
100. Id. at 787-88.
101. Slade & Colthurst, supra note 70, at 29.
2002]
556 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 18:543
FCA. First, in response to Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion, ' the
majority explicitly left open the question of whether a state can be
deemed a "person" for purposes of a qui tam action under the statute.0 3
Second, in a concurring opinion, Justice Ginsberg agreed with the
application of the "clear statement" rule, finding that the FCA lacked
"any clear statement subjecting the States to qui tam suits brought by
private parties."' However, her opinion also left open the issue of
whether the Court's ruling would apply if the relator was the United
States Government itself, rather than a private individual.'5
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court's dual ruling in Vermont
Agency will have a great impact. With regard to the issue that was
addressed first, the Court maintained that private litigants can indeed sue
under the FCA. This is positive news for the Federal Government, which
has been using the FCA as an effective means to combat healthcare
fraud."6 In contrast, by limiting the FCA's scope of potential defendants,
the Court has also restrained the Federal Government's ability to recover
damages from the States and state entities engaged in fraudulent
behavior.' 7 Some critics warn that the latter ruling will have "chilling
effects."'" However, query whether the effect of state immunity will be as
102. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter, dissented on grounds of
statutory interpretation. He found that the legislative history of the 1986
amendments disclosed that both federal and state officials understood that States
were "persons" within the meaning of the FCA. See Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at
793. In Stevens' view, "the committee unequivocally stated that the Act reaches
all parties who may submit false claims and that the term 'person' is used in its
broad sense to include partnerships, associations, and corporations ... as well as
States and political subdivisions thereof." Id.; see Senate Judiciary Committee,
supra note 2, at 8.
103. See Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 787; see also Ruhnka, supra note 16, at
286. The issue left open by 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) is whether the outcome would
have been the same if the Government had not intervened in the lawsuit.
104. Id. at 788-89.
105. Id. at 789.
106. See Slade & Colthurst, supra note 70, at 29.
107. Id.; see also Kenneth J. Nolan & Michael Flynn, Standing to Sue Under the
False Claims Act, 74 FLA.B.J. 7, 58-60 (2000).
108. See Slade & Colthurst, supra note 70, at 29 ("[T]he government will be
less likely to learn of the frauds involving states since the whistle-blowers have lost
the financial incentive to report such matters."); see also Nolan & Flynn, supra
note 107 ("[Tjhe only winners will be dishonest government contractors, and the
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"chilling" to the healthcare community as predicted.
II. THE HEALTH CARE PROVIDER'S RESPONSE TO USE OF
QUI TAM ACTIONS AS A TOOL TO DETER FRAUD
A. The Relation of the Physicians at Teaching Hospitals ("PATH")
Audits to Qui Tam Litigation
1. What is PATH?
Because of the manner in which Medicare reimburses academic
medical centers 'o9 and teaching hospitals, there has been an ongoing
concern that Medicare would be charged twice for the same service." '
Through the DOJ and the HHS, healthcare fraud was a main priority
during the Clinton Administration, particularly Medicare fraud." The
Office of Inspector General ("OIG") announced "a series of nationwide
reviews of compliance with rules governing physicians at teaching
hospitals [PATH] and other Medicare payment rules [in 1996]. "12 The
PATH initiative was undertaken by the Health Care Financing
Administration ("HCFA"), which administers Medicare, to determine
whether teaching hospitals were improperly billing Medicare by
"upcoding.. '"3
Following a 1995 settlement between the DOJ and the University of
Pennsylvania, wherein the University agreed to pay $30 million to the
DOJ, the OIG and HHS launched a nationwide PATH initiative. T The
losers will be their competitors,... [and] the taxpayers.").
109. An "academic medical center" is defined as "university-based health
centers that include at a minimum a hospital and associated clinics, a medical
school, or one of the other health professions schools." University of Washington
Academic Medical Center, UW AMC Fact Sheet, at
http://www.washington.edu/medical/about/#what (last modified Jan. 14, 2002).
110. See Pamela H. Bucy, The Path From Regulator to Hunter: The Exercise of
Prosecutorial Discretion in the Investigation of Physicians at Teaching Hospitals, 44
ST. Louis U.L.J. 3,4 (2000).
111. See Chielli, supra note 11.
112. Ass'n Am. Med. C., supra note 70.
113. "Upcoding" is "billing for a more complex level of care than was actually
provided." Harry R. Silver, PATH Audits May Be Challenged, at
http://www.ober.com/pubs/health/oosu20.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2002).
114. See Bucy, supra note 110, at 6. The investigation by the DOJ of the
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position of the HCFA is that teaching physicians can bill Medicare
properly for services rendered if the physician personally treats the
patient or, alternatively, if the teaching physician is present at the time
services are administered by the resident.'
The OIG initially commenced its PATH initiative by selecting one
hundred and twenty-five (125) teaching hospitals associated with each of
the nation's medical schools."6 The PATH initiative focuses on three
issues:
(i) whether the teaching physician on whose behalf a claim of
reimbursement under Medicare Part B was submitted was
physically present during all medical services performed; (ii)
whether the involvement of the treating physician with the
Medicare patient was adequately documented to justify
payment under Medicare Part B; and (iii) whether the level of
service billed to Medicare for the involvement of the teaching
physician was sufficiently documented." 7
By focusing on these issues, the OIG aimed to discover any fraudulent
behavior; however, the PATH initiative has been met with overwhelming
criticism by the targeted teaching hospitals who argue that the parameters
utilized to conduct the PATH audits need to be clarified."8 The requests
for clarification suggest that the standards for paying physicians under §
1395k(a)(2)(B)" 9 of Medicare have been confusing since their inception.'
20
University of Pennsylvania focused on billings by physicians and possible inflation
of services rendered.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 12.
117. Paul R. DeMuro & John D. Whipple, Health Care Fraud & Abuse: How
to Navigate the Compliance Process, 1999 PRAc. L. INST. 9, 11-12.
118. See Ass'n Am. Med. C., supra note 70.
119. Part B covers medical services provided directly to individuals on a fee-
for-service basis such as physician's services, medical supplies and
diagnostic/laboratory tests. Thus, Medicare Part B pays physicians, including
teaching physicians, for services provided directly to Medicare patients. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 1395k (1994).
120. See Ass'n Am. Med. C., supra note 70; see also Letter from Otis Bowen,
M.D. & Louis Sullivan, M.D., former HHS Secretaries, to Congressman John
Porter (R-II.), United States House of Representatives (Feb. 24, 1997) (on file
with the Association of American Medical Colleges). Drs. Bowen and Sullivan
stated that,
Really since the inception of the Medicare program the [HHS] has had a
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2. The Association of American Medical Colleges Challenge the
PATH Audits
As have many organizations before them, the Association of American
Medical Colleges ("AAMC") chose litigation as a means of correcting
what its members contend are serious flaws in the PATH project.' The
AAMC and the American Medical Association ("AMA"), along with a
host of other medical associations and numerous teaching hospitals, filed
suit against the Government, seeking to "end the way the PATH audits
are currently being conducted."'' 2
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged the following: that guidance to
teaching hospitals about reimbursement was vague and contradictory;
3
that PATH auditors inappropriately increased the authority of insurance
carrier policies;' 4 that the regulations issued in 1996 were being applied
retroactively to services rendered prior to their issuance;"' and most
importantly, that threats of FCA actions were being used as a coercive
force to settle pending lawsuits in violation of the Due Process Clause.' 26
The district court dismissed the complaint on procedural grounds,27 ruling
that the allegations regarding the conduct of the PATH audits were
speculative.)
Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed an appeal with the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals on July 11, 2000. Though the circuit court affirmed the holding
that there is no case or controversy under Article III of the Constitution,
they left "open [the] question[s] [of] whether the PATH audits will
actually result in findings of abuse or fraud"'2 9 and if the "OIG could still
modify its rather draconian view of the Act's requirements for Part B
difficult time in setting forth a bright line standard that could be used to
separate the services provided by an attending physician that are strictly
teaching in nature and those that involve care to a specific patient. Id.
121. See Silver, supra note 113.
122. See Chielli, supra note 11.




127. See Ass'n of Am. Med. Colleges v. U.S., 34 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1195 (C.D.
Cal. 1998) (Procedurally, the court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and lack of ripeness for adjudication).
128. See id. at 1193-95.
129. See Ass'n of Am. Med. Colleges v. U.S., 217 F.3d 770, 781 (9th Cir. 2000).
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billing."13 Additionally, the court found too speculative whether PATH
audits would result in threatened prosecution under the FCA; however,
the court will gladly take up this issue as long as the claim is ripe for
adjudication.31
III. ANALYSIS: STATE ENTITIES ARE NO LONGER LIABLE
UNDER THE FCA-NOW WHAT?
A. Coercive Settlements Becoming A Thing of the Past
Teaching hospitals contend that there is an aura of compulsion
surrounding the PATH audits, and consequently believe that there is no
other choice but to settle with the Government or risk future litigation
under the FCA.'32 Yet, as the Government has become more aggressive
in its enforcement of the FCA, healthcare providers have begun to fight
back.'33
The complaint by healthcare providers of vulnerability to coercive
settlements is certainly understandable. Whether or not a case is initiated
based upon a PATH audit or qui tam filing, defendants generally move
the case toward settlement due to fear that the litigation could take years
and become extremely expensive.'34 Even though providers may well
believe they have a defensible position,3 ' settlement is often pursued
because the Government need only prove knowledge, recklessness or
deliberate ignorance of billing error by a preponderance of the evidence
130. Id.
131. See id. at 782 (For a claim to be ripe for adjudication, it must not rest
upon "contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may
not occur at all.").
132. See Bucy, supra note 110, at 14.
133. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Sharon L. Davies, The Empire Strikes Back:
A Critique of the Backlash Against Fraud and Abuse Enforcement, 51 ALA. L.
REV. 239, 258 (1999).
134. See id. at 306. There are no publicly available statistics on the proportion
of fraud and abuse cases that are settled and those that go to judgment. For one
indication of the prevalence of settlements, see THE U.S. DEP'T OF H.H.S. & U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. FISCAL YEAR 1997, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/HEALTH97.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2002)
(describing a sampling of cases brought or settled under criminal or civil false
claims authorities during fiscal year 1997).
135. See Jost & Davies, supra note 133, at 307.
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under the FCA.'" To providers facing the risk of penalties running into
the millions of dollars, the finality of settlement looks very attractive
compared to the risk of an even larger judgment.'37
As a result of Vermont Agency, the issue of vulnerability for state
agencies and state-funded hospitals has been resolved. By decreasing the
number of potential defendants against which a qui tam claim can be
filed, 38 healthcare providers now have a larger shield to protect against
frivolous lawsuits. "9 In this respect, the ruling is beneficial to both state-
funded healthcare providers and the public by restraining overzealous
FCA enforcement, thereby allowing caregivers to use the resources they
have on the patients.'
Since Vermont Agency, the same issue has not arisen as to whether a
county or municipal entity can be held liable under the FCA. Until
recently the issue had not been addressed by any circuit court.'1 The
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that,
pursuant to Vermont Agency, the County of Delaware could not be sued
under the FCA.'4 2 The court held that the action could not continue
against the county due to the punitive nature of the damages mandated by
the FCA.143  Additionally, the court determined that the presumption
against imposing punitive damages on governmental entities was not
overcome because there was no showing of statutory intent to the
contrary.'" This finding has further narrowed the scope of defendants
upon which a qui tam relator can cast its spell.
B. Compliance Programs: The Path Less Traveled Looks More
136. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1994).
137. See Jost & Davies, supra note 133, at 307.
138. See High Court Limits False Claims Suits, 3 HEALTH CARE FRAUD &
ABUSE NEWSL. 5 (Leader Publications, division of American Lawyer Media), June
2000, at 1.
139. See John T. Boese, Can Substandard Medical Care Become Fraud?
Understanding An Unfortunate Expansion of Liability Under the Civil False
Claims Act, 2000 A.B.A. SEC. Bus.L.REP. 30, 37.
140. Id.
141. See A.B.A., supra note 9, at 62.
142. See U.S. ex rel. Dunleavy v. County of Delaware, et. al., No. 94-7000, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14980, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2000).
143. See id. at *16.
144. See id. at *18-19.
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Attractive
Increasingly, healthcare providers have been asking what they can do
to avoid being swept up in the frenzy of the aggressive nature of the
Government's current healthcare fraud enforcement environment.14
Compliance programs, although not perfect, are the best tool to deter
misconduct.'16 An effective compliance program can act as a means for
providing a measure of insurance for healthcare companies in order to
prevent fraudulent activities.
A descendant of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,'47 compliance
programs are usually imposed by the Government in Corporate Integrity
Agreements,' 48 as part of settling healthcare fraud charges.19 Instead of
acquiescing to a government-imposed compliance program, it behooves
hospitals and other healthcare providers to voluntarily adopt their own
compliance program and tailor it to their needs.'
1. The OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals
Faced with today's complicated healthcare regulatory environment, the
OIG deemed it necessary to formulate a model plan. This plan assists
hospitals in the development of effective internal controls that promote
145. Thomas E. Bartrum & L. Edward Bryant, Jr., The Brave New World of
Health Care Compliance Programs, 6 ANNALS HEALTH L. 51, 55 (1997); see
Corrine Parver & Justin D. Simon, The Ugly Spector of Health Care Fraud: Do
you Know If Your Home Care Company is Adequately Protected? Guidance on
Developing and Implementing an Effective Compliance Program, 1 (Oct. 2000)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Dickstein, Shapiro, Morin, & Oshinsky,
L.L.P.).
146. See Bartrum & Bryant, supra note 145.
147. See Parver & Simon, supra note 145 ("As reflected in the federal
Sentencing Guidelines..., an effective corporate compliance program must
contain elements which are designed to prevent, detect, investigate and remediate
compliance problems.").
148. See id. at 1-2 ("For example, when companies enter into settlement
agreements, the government usually insists on the companies performing
compliance audits of their federal contract programs for a number of years into
the future to make sure they are complying with the promises being made.").
149. See Bartrum & Bryant, supra note 145.
150. See Lewis Morris & Gary W. Thompson, Reflections on the Government's
Stick and Carrot Approach to Fighting Health Care Fraud, 51 ALA.L.REv. 319, 348
(1999).
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adherence to federal and state law.' The OIG notes that this model plan
"is by no means meant to be an exhaustive list" and, therefore, suggests
that providers implement their own compliance plans that address their
specific needs.'52
There are seven essential elements necessary for the establishment of a
comprehensive compliance program.' These include the following: (1)
development and distribution of written standards of conduct, as well as
written policies and procedures that promote the hospitals' commitment
to compliance; (2) designation of a chief compliance officer and other
appropriate bodies; (3) development and implementation of effective
education and training programs for all affected employees; (4)
maintenance of a process to receive complaints, and adoption of
procedures to protect the anonymity of whistleblowers; (5) development
of a system to respond to allegations of improper/illegal activities and the
enforcement of appropriate disciplinary action against employees who
have violated internal compliance policies; (6) use of audits and/or other
evaluation techniques to monitor compliance; and (7) investigation and
remediation of identified systemic problems and the development of
policies addressing the non-employment or retention of sanctioned
individuals.'54
The OIG provides a model that attempts to establish a foundation for
the process of creating and implementing a cost-effective and efficient
hospital compliance program.'5 The OIG does not expect that every
hospital's compliance program will be identical to the model provided,
but suggests that each entity make a good faith commitment to ensure
that their compliance program is successful.5 6 Furthermore, the OIG
recognizes that each program should be tailored to fit the needs of
individual hospitals. 7
151. See Ruthann Russo & Joseph J. Russo, Healthcare Compliance Plans:
Good Business Practice for the New Millenium, J. AHIMA, (last visited Oct. 24,
2000), at http://www.ahima.org/journal.
152. Id.
153. See Carole L. Basri, The Office of Inspector General's Compliance
Program Guidance for Hospitals, 1998 PRAC. L. INST. 857, 865.
154. See id. at 865-66.
155. Id. at 902.
156. Id. at 902-03.
157. See Russo & Russo, supra note 151.
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2. Benefits of a Compliance Program
The OIG's primary goal is to ensure that the law is not violated,58 but
compliance programs provide numerous additional benefits. A
compliance program provides early detection of wrongful conduct which
decreases the potential for liability and prevents qui tam suits. '59
Additionally, compliance programs present a number of economic
advantages. Such programs reduce legal costs by encouraging employees
to report potential problems to the employer before filing a qui tam suit.
161
They also improve the speed and quality of responses to lawsuits once
they arise.'61 Moreover, the costs of implementing a voluntary compliance
program are tax deductible and the legal costs are reimbursable on a
Medicare cost report, so long as they are reasonably related to patient
162
care.
Lastly, compliance programs may improve employee morale,163 thereby
acting as a deterrent against the filing of a qui tam claim by an employee
who discovers conduct that may not be proper. There is no time like the
present for hospitals and healthcare providers to guard against liability on
their own terms.
CONCLUSION
Although the decision in Vermont Agency is believed by some to be the
death knell for qui tam litigation, the case stands for the proposition that
"enough is enough" when it comes to filing qui tam suits which may or
may not have merit. While the Court implicitly agrees that the FCA is a
powerful tool in the fight against healthcare fraud, it also realizes that the
158. Katheryn Ehler-Lejcher, The Expansion of Corporate Compliance:
Guidance for Health Care Entities, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1339, 1378 (1999).
159. See id. at 1379.
160. Id. at 1380.
161. See id. ("An effective compliance program would include the
development of ongoing monitoring and review procedures to ensure compliance
procedures are effective and to ensure compliance with new developments in the
law."). Parver & Simon, supra note 145, at 3 (emphasis added).
162. Id. at 1381 & n.287 ("However, costs from the implementation of a
corporate compliance program imposed by the government as a result of a civil...
judgment or settlement are not reimbursable."). See also Bartrum & Bryant,
supra note 145, at 55-56.
163. See Ehler-Lejcher, supra note 158, at 1382.
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FCA has significant potential for abuse.
In the past, qui tam claims have undermined the effectiveness of federal
and state regulatory efforts to adopt compliance programs;'" however,
Vermont Agency provides positive incentives for administrators to employ
these kinds of enforcement mechanisms to protect against fraud. Because
FCA liability "is triggered whenever any statement made to secure
reimbursement is inaccurate,.' 65 compliance programs benefit healthcare
providers by halting any potential fraud from the outset, thereby
restricting qui tam liability. Alternatively, it has been suggested that the
FCA be amended once again to accentuate the positive of the qui tam
provision, and filter out its destructive effects on the healthcare
community."
Vermont Agency sends the message to both the Government and the
healthcare community that the qui tam provision of the FCA can no
longer be used as a crutch for enforcing fraud and abuse. Rather, the
Court has set boundaries'67 on its use for the implicit purpose of creating a
more efficient instrument to combat fraud. The Court has opened the
door to reform the Government's fraud and abuse enforcement
mechanisms and it is now time to heed the advice of the highest court in
the land.
164. See Ruhnka, et al., supra note 16, at 304.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 305 ("[Q]ui tam probably should be retained, but in modified
form. We suggest that it is time for Congress to revisit the FCA to eliminate some
of its more destructive effects on regulatory agency efforts to achieve more cost-
effective compliance through voluntary compliance and self-reporting
programs.").
167. See Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. 765, 787 (2000) (The Court erected a wall
around a private individual's ability to bring suit in federal court under the FCA
by disallowing a state (or state agency) to be subject to liability in such actions).
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